Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne. Résumé de l'article Dans son sens le plus large, le salaire d'investissement est cette partie du salaire des travailleurs qui ne peut être dépensée pour la consommation pendant un certain temps, parce qu'il est placé pour eux dans l'économie sous forme de capital. Les discussions sur ce sujet en Allemagne ont démontré que cette théorie peut être appliquée selon plusieurs processus et de diverses façons. L'objectif est d'accroître la richesse des travailleurs de façon à leur apporter une plus grande sécurité. En plus de cet objectif à caractère individuel, le salaire d'investissement vise une fin sociale : permettre à tous les agents de l'économie de bénéficier du produit national et diminuer ainsi les écarts économiques. L'épargne individuelle, à elle seule, n'a pas réussi à donner aux travailleurs une part plus grande de l'ensemble de la propriété nationale. C'est à cette lacune que veut pallier la théorie du salaire d'investissement.
Investment-Wages: Theory and Application

Gerhard Reber
After having defined and explained the goals ôf investment-wages, the author establishes their social and éco-nomie framework and gives an example drawn from the West-German construction industry.
What are investment-wages and what is their aim ?
Investment-wages in their broadest sensé are that portion of workers' wages which cannot be spent for consumption for a certain time *, because they are invested on their behalf on the capital side of the economy. Discussions about the idea of investment-wages in Gennany hâve shown that the basic theory can be applied in a multitude of forms and variations. The abovementioned définition suggests the investment of a part of the current wages of the employée. Sometimes called « subtractive investmentwages >, this type of investment-wages would diminish the current nominal income of the employée, but this is only of theoretical interest. In practice, what has been discussed is an « additive » type of investmentwages. This means that the contribution to the capital side, or the renounced consumption, or the temporary savings, are obtained from increased wages. 3 ) of employées in order to bring them increased security. Besides this aim, with its accent on the individual, the investment-wages plan also pursues a social goal : that of permitting ail members of the economy to share the national product in such a way that the différences in income and property are successively reduced. Wide-spread, evenly distributed accumulation of property is aimed at in order to minimize the différences between social classes, to protect society from harmful, radical struggles between property owners and non-owners, and, thereby, to make industrialized society less vulnérable to communistic agitation. As the history of the distribution of wealth in West-Germany shows, voluntary, individual saving has not led to the employées' accumulation of an increasing share of the total amount of property. The « rich » employers become richer more quickly than the other members of the economy ; the gap between the employers and the employées is growing wider. In view of the fact that voluntary saving is obviously not effective enough, part of the wage increase should not be paid out, since it would be another incentive for spending, but be retained and thus converted into long-term property 4 . Temporary and compulsory individual saving seems to be the indispensible price of starting a « capitaliste » éducation of the employées. But this price is only worth paying if within the économie process the advantages of « investment-wages » exceed the disadvantages.
The chief criterion for evaluating investment-wages is taken to be their consistency with principles and functional features of the économie theory which prevails in West-Germany -the so-called « Soziale Marktwirtschaft », i.e., social market economy. Under Part II, « The Social and Economie Framework », we shall first describe empirical background of investment-wages, and subsequently deal with the principles and functional pattern of the social market economy as their theoretical back- 3 In German the use of the standard économie term « Vermôgensbildung » became more and more popular in the context of investment-wages and similar programs. We will generally translate this term as « property accumulation ». As noted by the translater of Accumulation of Assets for the Worker by G. LEBER (Schriftenreihe der Industriegewerkschaft Bau-Steine-Erden, Frankfurt/M, p. 10) : « the 'property' involved is not necessarily real property, but could be better understood as 'individual capital assets'. In this vein one might coin an English équivalent of 'Vermôgensbildung' by using the phrase 'personal assets formation', but this awkward phrase would hâve little meaning to most persons. Germany has had a far-reaching social insurance System for décades... to many non-German readers at least, this pension coverage would be considered as a personal asset of considé-rable value. In gênerai, however, compulsory insurance benefits of this type do not in Germany fall within the framework of 'property accumulation'. » 4 MEINHOLD, H., « Some Comments on Invested Wages », in : G. LEBER, Accumulation of Assets for the Worker, op. cit., p. 91. ground. In the Part III, following thèse fundamental remarks, we shall tum to a considération of the first concrète application of investmentwages in the West-German construction industry. The first part of this chapter contains the pubhcly presented and openly discussed proposai of the construction workers' union 5 , as well as the outcome of the ensuing collective bargaining process. The second part of the chapter attempts to describe and evaluate the effects of the collective agreement -insofar as such effects hâve become visible up to the time of writing.
The social and économie framework THE EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND Two years after the foundation of the social market economy in 1948 the Independent Scientific Council for Economie Affairs of the Government concluded that the distribution of property was « inéquit-able ». Since that time various statistical investigations hâve been made of the distribution of private property. The last reports made by économie experts before the Leber-Plan was launched, and to which the Plan refers 6 , cover the period between 1950 and 1960, were carried out by Cari Fôhl 7 and O. de la Chevallerie 8 , and published in 1964. Both reports, but especially the survey by Fôhl, which was initiated by order of the fédéral government, provoked wide public discussion. Both the central association of employers and the central fédération of employées considered the report and rejected some of its statistical methods and results. But this mainly revealed, as predicted by Fôhl, difficulties in gaining the représentative and detailed statistical material. The gênerai trends portrayed by Fôhl's report were not challenged.
Even before the publication of the Fôhl report, the Fédéral Ministry of Labour (Bundesministerium fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung) had asked Wilhelm Krelle to research the économie possibilities and conséquences of profit-sharing on the basis of Systems which operate beyond the level 5 The so-called « Leber-Plan ». At that time Georg Leber was président of the construction worker's union ; at the time of writing he is Fédéral Minister of Transport.
6 Cf. LEBER, G., Accumulation of Assets for the Worker, op. cit., p. 17. 7 FÔHL, C, Kreislaufanalytische Untersuchungen der Vermôgensbildung, (Mohr : Tiibingen, 1964 
The Primary Distribution of Income between Employer s n and Employées
The net average income for 1955 and 1959 of various économie classes in Germany is shown in Table I . Arbeitnehmer, 2 Volumes (Mohr : Tùbingen, 1968) . 10 The following statistics cover the period from 1950 to the first collective agreement pertaining to investment wages (Jan. 1, 1966) . More récent figures wilî be given below.
11 Included under the heading « employers » are ail « self-employed » or « independent » persons, in contrast to the « dépendent » employées.
In 1959 37% of employers and 18% of salary earners, but only 9% of wage earners had a monthly sum of DM 1,200 or more at their disposai. 14.5% of ail employers, 37.7% of ail salary earners and 52% of ail wage earners made 600 DM or less per month in 1959 12 .
Within the income-strata there is a trend from the lower to the middle and higher income classes. In 1959 (1955) about 6% (15%) had an income under 200 DM per month, but already 2.5% (1%) had an income above 2,000 DM. The most fréquent income was 360 DM in 1955 , 470 DM in 1959 . Among wage earners the modal class was in the range between 300 and 700 DM ; while 50% of the employers had an income above 1,000 DM per month 13 . About 18 million employées gained an 82% increase of their net income between 1950 and 1960 ; 4 million employers gained an increase of 356% -from 4,800 million to 21,900 million 14 . In spite of the activity of the unions wages continued to account for only about 60% of the national income. The « wage-rate », Le., the employées' share of the total national income, stayed around this « Magic 60 » for about 40 years : 1925 -59.9% ; 1929 -61.9% ; 1932 -61.8% ; 1950 -59.2% ; 1956 -60.4% ; 1960 -61.0% 15 . During this period of an approximately constant « wage-rate » the number of employées was increasing (from 1950 to 1960 about 5.5 million more individuals were employed) while the number of employers was decreasing (about 600,000 less) 16 . Beginning in 1961 the « magie 60% » hâve been exceeded : the employées' share of the total national income rose to 62.5% in 1961, 63.9% in 1962, 64.5% in 1963, 64.6% in 1964, and to 65.4% in 1965 n , while the employers' share decreased from 39. 2% (1960) 
The Distribution of Saving and Property by Socio-Economie Groups
According to Fohl private households accumulated net property to the value of 152,700 million DM in the years from 1950 to 1959. The breakdown by différent private households is shown in Table II : This table shows that only 2.8 million (or 17%) of ail private households accounted for 75% of the total accumulation of property. A second separate investigation 19 revealed the same tendency : in 1959 18.9 million employées saved 6,100 million DM ; 3.2 million employers saved 6,800 million DM. This accounts for an average of 322 DM per employée and 2,125 DM per employer. In the same year there were accumulated 10,800 million DM of undistributed profit in non-corporated enterprises. This amounts to 5,500 DM per employer, or 17 times the per capita amount of the employées. The undistributed profit of the corporate entities for the same year is estimated at 6,600 million DM. There is no doubt that only a small amount of stocks is owned by employées. Therefore, this undistributed profit of the corporations must also be added to the property of the employers.
If we calculate the ratio between savings and income, then in 1959 the saving-rate of the wage earners reached 4.3%, that of the pensioners 4.7%, and that of the salary earners 10.8% 20 . The total saving-rate of ail private income earners has levelled off since 1958 at around 9% 21 . In addition to the voluntary saving-rate we must not forget the compulsory savings under West-Germany's social security System. 14% of the gross income of the employées is set aside for pensions 22 , thus diminishing their capacity for saving.
The investigation made by Krelle, Schunck and Siebke, covering the period from 1950 to 1963, summarizes the history of property structure as follows :
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Of the total amount of property accumulated by private households between 1950 and 1963, 56% fell to the employées and pensioners (wage earners: 17%, salary earners: 19%, civil servants: 7%, pensioners: 13%), and 44% fell to the employers (farmers : 6%, others : 38%). The per capita accumulation of property from 1950 to 1963 amounted to 3,200 DM for the employées and pensioners (wage earners : 2,100 DM, salary earners : 4,800 DM, civil servants : 6,800 DM, pensioners : 2,900 DM), and to 12,700 DM for the employers (farmers : 3,400 DM, others : 22,000DM). A conservative estimate of the total property of private households would be 304,000 million DM for 1960, that is, 5,700 DM per capita of the total population.
For 1960 the distribution of private property by order of magnitude is as follows : 460 households (= 0.0026% of the total) possessed over 10 million DM; together, 4.01% of the total property.
13,540 households (= 0.0758% of the total) possessed between 1 and 10 million DM; together, 9.16% of the total property. This shows great inequality, but not a concentration of property in relatively few hands. Criticism could more readily focus on the distribution of industrial capital. 33% of this type of property belonged to households with a total property of more than 1 million DM. 80% of the property of households owning more than 1 million DM consists of capital in private enterprises. And this represents a significant concentration, considering that there were only 14,000 such households.
The Increased Demand for Capital
Technical progress and modem production methods demand an increasing amount of capital. When Karl Marx wrote « Das Kapital » the equipment required for a project in the residential field of the construction industry consisted of some wood for a scaffold, some vats for the mortar, some wheel-barrows, and perhaps a horse-drawn vehicle. 40 years ago capitalization per employée reached 450 DM in the residential construction field. Today in some parts of the same industry, 46,000 DM per employée are being spent 24 . The capital-labour ratio in West-German industry in gênerai reached an average of 12,800 DM per employée in 1950. It rose to 26,200 in 1962. In the automobile industry the required amount per employée was tripled in the same time-span. A refinery constructed near Mannheim in 1964 required an investment of 240 million DM but is run by only 300 employées (800,000 DM per employed person).
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Principles of the Social Market Economy
The idea of a social market economy centers on the market. The participants in the economy plan to meet each other within the market in the form of « demand and supply » for différent goods and factors to agrée about contracts in freedom and self-responsibility 25 . The factors of production (capital and labour) are generally allocated according to the conditions of supply and demand in this open pricing System ; in the same way the primary distribution of income is also determined by the laws of the market 26 . But in contrast to the classical liberalism the conditions and results of a functioning market economy are not necessarily accepted. The belief and trust in the optimal automatic self-direction of the free market economy is tempered 27 . The fallacy of « natural », mechanical harmony M is replaced by active, « harmonious » 29 government intervention in co-operation with ail groups in society. The classical 30 concept is superseded and supplemented by the following four amendments : 1.) A functioning free enterprise System -understood as the direction of production according to the urgency of needs -is not automatically stable, therefore an active stabilizing policy on the part of the government is necessary.
2) The results of the market-process are not automatically accepted, especially with respect to the distribution of national income. The distribution of income determined by the market has to be corrected by a secondary redistribution. But the redistribution has to occur without essential violations of the compétitive market forces within the System.
3) It is not assumed that the interaction of market forces always secures full employment. The government has to hâve an active businesscycle policy. This policy stimulâtes or slows down private demandespecially the demand for investment goods -and public demand as the need arises. In order to link the trade-cycle policy with the principles of the market economy, the government tries to accomplish the following three aims simultaneously : full employment, stable priées, and balanceof-payments equilibrium. Thèse aims are often called the « magie triangle » because « sometimes some magie power seemed to be necessary to reach thèse ends simultaneously » 31 ; nevertheless, there is a guideline and an optimum balance between thèse aims which should be sought 32 . 4) As to the redistribution of income, the government should try to wield influence not merely by means of a secondary redistribution but also by means of affecting the underlying conditions of the income and property promoting process in accordance with acceptable social criteria. In order not to disturb the sound distribution of income according to the rules of a relatively free market, the government at first should confine its activity to means consistent with the essential prerequisites of the market. This can be attempted through more or less vigorous tax changes, foreigntrade policy, etc. Only in the case of serious problems should strong and direct means -like subsidies -be applied, and then only as long as the period of disturbance continues or as long as a new adjustment to the changed situation can be expected. Any direct initiative by the government should be reserved as an exception for emergencies. The primary distribution of income should be decided by the agents of collective bargaining. Union and management should acknowledge the objectives of the « magie triangle », and their duty should be performed in co-operation with the government. Only this co-operation will keep the social market economy in opération. Therefore this économie System can only be successful as long as none of the agents of collective bargaining or the government exceed their normal power. An undesirable encroachment occurs if the government détermines wages or if the social partners agrée to terms which jeopardize the économie policy of the government.
In this concept of the social market economy the rôle and fonction of unions are enlarged from a straight-forward pressure group to that of participants in a nation-wide co-operative effort. According to this interprétation the labour movement has to cope successfully with two opposite périls, which were described in différent éditions of the Economist : On the one hand, the opinion was expressed that given three désirable ends, namely full employment, stable priées, and free labour movement, only two can be accomplished at the same time 33 , and on the other hand, it was held that the modération of the British unions was responsible for the low productivity of the British industry 34 . In both situations the unions are seen as the scapegoat : in the first instance a free and active labour movement is considered the basic cause of inflation or underemployment ; in the second, the unions are accused of failing to stimulate the economy through their inactivity. Labour organizations must somehow find the proper balance between thèse two extrêmes. 33 Quoted by E. ARNDT, op. cit., (Préface). 34 COSER, L.A., Social Conflict and Social Change, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. VIII,, No. 3 (1957) p. 198. In considération of the question whether the idea of investmentwages is compatible with the abovementioned principles of a social market economy, there are two problems especially worth noting : It is necessary a) to détermine whether investment-wages can be bargained collectively, and b) to discuss their compulsory aspect. a) Never before had collective agreements dealt with employée rémuné-ration part of which was to be put under certain constraints in terms of its distribution. It was expected that the employers would claim that such a clause should not be the object of a collective agreement. Therefore, various légal scholars were asked to give their opinions on this matter. The situation was clarified when Parliament passed a law 35 which enabled the agents of employers and employées to include in collective agreements a certain amount (maximum 312 DM per year), which the employer could pay free of profit -and wage taxes, and free of contributions to the social security system, // the employée was saving this income 36 . Under thèse conditions the majority of the légal studies made led to positive results as far as the employées were concerned 37 .
According to thèse investigations, investment-wages as such are constituent éléments of the wage package 38 . The goverament should not interfère if the « social partners » (fédérations of employers and of employées) corne to an agreement about investment-wages.
b) The employers respected this décision after some hésitation; they finally accepted the confrontation. Their objections and those of strict adhérents to individualiste ideas then turned to the collective, compulsory aspects of the proposition. This problem still animâtes socio-political discussions today.
Generally it is held that, as far as possible, savings should be made on a voluntary basis, Le., saving should be promoted by incentives or by 39 . An advertising campaign promoting savings would require tremendous financial resources, and even then would likely be relatively unsuccessful. Expérience ^ with the First Property Accumulation Law confirms the reasoning that individualistic measures are inadéquate to achieve the desired broader distribution of property. Adhérents of the compulsory measure state that propaganda and incentives addressed to the individual propensity to save are overwhelmed by social incentives stimulating consumption 41 . Besides pointing out thèse psychological aspects, scholars of political economy support the basic consistency of the compulsory aspect of investment-wages with the principles of a social market economy. Meinhold, for example, explains : « On the basis of our employment and growthrate oriented policy, realized by the means of easy money, the question of a completely free control over the distribution of the income is already answered »
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. « Easy money » means an increase in the quantity of money. As a conséquence of each increase -for the sake of full employment -income receivers lose some control over the national product. Control is lost to the extent to which the increased quantity of money exceeds savings. A trend toward higher priées can be empirically recognized (the increased quantity of money always seems to tend to exceed the increase of supply). The winner is, at least at the beginning of the price increase, the entity of employers. The problem of income distribution is 39 So, for example, H. MEINHOLD, Some Comments on lnvested Wages, op. cit., p. 91. 40 BRAUN, K., writes in the Monthly Labor Review, op. cit., p. 972 : « A 1964 government survey indicated that in the three years 1961-63 relatively little use had been made of the law of July 12, 1961. Total payments for capital accumulation of 67.5 million DM ... were received by only 250,000 employées (110,000 wage earners and 140,000 white collar workers), or 2% of the work force in the enterprises covered by the survey. (Thèse firms employed about two-thirds of the employées in the private economy) ».
41 WALLRAFF, H.J., Grenzen ethischer Gegenargumente, in : G. LEBER, Dokumentation, Band 3, op. cit., p. 148 : « Since the émancipation of the citizen demonstrated consumption was translated into social réputation. This fact has today become an essential connotation of our western world. Social strata with higher income can demonstrate this amount of consumption, which préserves or increases their social prestige, and, in spite of that consumption, they can save, too. But ail strata which lie under the middlé income of the society can only save without loss of social réputation if ail neighbours and colleagues save as much. The average citizen does not understand the modem philosophy, but he practises a vulgar form of existentialism... In this climate savings and investments will not be favoured, especially if there is nothing to begin with ».
42 MEINHOLD, H., Investivlohn und soziale Marktwirtschaft, in : G. LEBER, Dokumentation, Band 3, op. cit., p. 67. raised as soon as we break with the principles of the classical economy. « The idea of investment-wages tries to realize this necessary connection not only in favour of the employers. In principle there is no différence, only the connection is more easily visible » 43 .
Meinhold's reasoning is already based on the modem theory of political economy : we hâve to dig a little deeper in the theory if we raise the question to what extent investment-wages can be applied in a growing economy given the aims of full employment and price stability.
Income Distribution in a Growing Economy
According to Keynes, « consumption is the sole end and the object of ail économie activity » u . The desires of consumers détermine the direction of the economy. If we demand more cars, then, there may be a temporary scarcity, but in the long run we will hâve more, not fewer cars. But the capacity even of an expanding economy is not unlimited. So much of a national economy should be used for the production of consumergoods, and so much for the production of investment goods. If one assumes that investments of a certain level and kind are essential to économie progress and growth, the following points are valid : 1) Too much current consumption will absorb so much économie capacity that it thereby will diminish the possibility of économie growth and higher consumption in the future 45 .
2) Too little current consumption 46 will not stimulate any investment, because the présent capacity of the economy will be able to produce the demanded consumer-goods. The conséquence will be that the employées of the suppliers of investment-goods lose their employment, thus starting a deflationary tendency.
Thèse assertions lead to the following conclusions : 1) Consumption and investment together are limited by the total capacity of the economy. This capacity cannot be expanded instantly, but it can be expanded over time. 2) Over-consumption is as detrimental as under-consumption : too much consumption slows down économie growth and brings unemployment and déflation.
If the government, in its endeavour to stimulate a suitable mix of consumption and investment, cornes to the conclusion that consumption should be diminished, then increased savings can be realized simultaneously. Saving simply means « non-consumption » 47 . Each saver restricts consumption and if the declined demand for consumer-goods. is not compensated by an increased demand for other goods, then production and employment within the national economy will be reduced.
On the monetary side, saving means that money is taken out of circulation. But the banking system does not dépend for its crédit volume solely on the amount of savings deposits. If the banking system supplies the employer with crédit, then investment can occur independently of saving. Saving as such means dépression, investment as such means expansion. We may find in the additional investments made by employers with money borrowed from the banking system 48 the compensation for any décline in demand induced by saving. The total demand, production, and employment remain constant if the additional investments are the same as the savings.
Ail the statements made above are based on Keynes' « General Theory » and his method of « Income Analysis ». But we hâve to go beyond his static conception to recognize the continuing conséquences of investment in a dynamic, growing economy. We saw that investment as a part of total demand produces employment and income. This aspect of investment is called the « income effect » 49 . Keynes exclusively confined his observations to this aspect of investment. But the major purpose of investment to the employer is to increase his capacity. This créâtes the socalled « capacity effect » 50 of investment. The capacity effect will be visible with the beginning of the output of the newly finished equipment ; but will operate after a certain time-lag (time of construction) in contrast to the income effect. The income effect stimulâtes demand ; the capacity effect créâtes an increased potential supply. The latter will only be forth- 1) the propensity to save, 2) the propensity to invest, 3) the capital or technical coefficient of production.
We must also add an « equilibrium-equation » (the additional income should be equal to the additional production) because we are trying to avoid trade cycles and to establish a steadily growing economy.
The capital or « technical coefficient » refers « to the quantities of the différent factors required, under given technical conditions of production, to produce a given quantity of a certain good or commodity » 51 , or in short, it means the technical ratio between investment and the increased production supplied.
Thèse thoughts can be summarized in a simplified, domestic static model in equilibrium, as shown in Illustration I :
In connection with the simplified model we can raise the following crucial question : Where is the point at which the distribution of income begins to be changed ?
If the increase in wages is the sarne as the increase in overall productivity, then only the potential demand for the increased supply (under constant priées) is created, the distribution of income is not changed. Or, in other words : if the wages increase to the same extent as the technical progress diminishes the costs per unit of output, then the ratio between wages and profit per unit of output is not changed ; the distribution of the social product between wages and profit remains the same. If the real savings of the wage-earners should be increased, then the wage-rate must exceed the increase in productivity. This includes a sacrifice on the part of the profit-receiver. As the employées hâve to renounce the so-called , a policy which expands the wages above the advance in productivity and gives to the employée free application (consumption) of the entire wage increase ; so the employers should be willing to accept a lowering of their profit. Whether or not they do so, they can in any case react in three ways :
1) The employers may respond to decreased profits by creating an additional demand -of an amount équivalent to the investment-wages -for investment-goods. The saved investment-wages make crédits in the required quantity possible. The propensity to invest leads to an increase in the macroeconomic demand and permits a price -and profit increase 53 .
An investment expansion would demonstrate behaviour oriented toward macroeconomic rationality.
It is possible to assume 54 that employers may not act in accordance with macroeconomic rationality but rather in orientation toward microeconomic profits and sales (microeconomic rationality). Since sales remain constant and profits decrease, the employers, according to this opinion, will not tend to invest. The behaviour of West-German employers during the dépression of 1966-67 confirmed this prédiction : during that time there was little propensity to invest, even though capital was easily obtainable.
2) The employers' propensity to invest may decrease, and thus growth and employment may decrease, or 3) The employers may increase priées, in order to pass on the additional costs. In the latter case the demand would not be big enough to purchase the présent supply at higher priées, because part of the increased wages are saved. In conséquence less produced goods can be sold and this -if the priées are not to be reduced -would lead to underemployment, which would force the government -according to the aims of the social market economy, especially « full employment » -to take stimulating measures. The gap in the demand would be closed and in this way the price increases would be sanctioned. AU thèse undesirable developments are possible and probable if the investment-wages start with a high amount. The danger is diminished in a growing economy, especially if the increasing investment-wages do not reach an amount which threatens a positive development of the profit. Based on our simple model, and under the assumption of Meinhold's estimation of a growth-rate of 5 percent (without cumulation), a very simplified expanding model (Illustration II) can demonstrate a simultaneous positive development of profit and investment-wages 55 : investment-wages (IW) start in the year 1 ; the normal wages (W) and the expenditures of the government (GE) increase with the same percentage as the social product. It is not possible for marginal enterprises to survive in this trend. They operate just at the margin of profitableness ; each decrease of profit jeopardizes their existence. In a pure market economy this is to be expected ; more than that, the expelling of the marginal opération is desired in favour of the more efficiently performing enterprises. If we pay any attention to the reality of the social market economy, then in the question of the closing of inefficient enterprises ail « rules of the market » seemed often to be neglected. Hère especially the term social market economy seems to become vague and diffusive.
Whatever may be the actual behaviour of ail involved groups, the preceding remarks show with some certainty that the social market economy can digest the application of investment-wages without price increases and without jeopardizing full employment, if the investment-wages are introduced in modest proportions 56 . With respect to the distribution of property in favour of the employées, the use of investment-wages cannot be expected to lead to great short-term success ; significant changes can only be expected in the long run 57 . This fact éliminâtes investment wages as a means of expanding the influence of employées in a capitalistic economy for ail those 58 who are interested in a short-term solution. One way of attaining such a short-term expansion of employée influence in 55 MEINHOLD, H., Investivlohn und soziale Marktwirtschaft, in : G. LEBER, Dokumentation, Band 3, op. cit., p. 73. 56 Meinhold estimâtes that at a growth-rate of 5% of the entire economy, a Vi% increase of the annual total wage income in the form of investment-wages is private industry might be worker participation by law. The unions' demands for législative initiative pertaining to worker participation, and for measures intended to increase the amount of property in the hands of employées, are thus complimentary long-and short-term straté-gies. The construction workers' union above ail is an adhèrent of the long-term solution. Their proposai and collective agreement pertaining to investment-wages wil be dealt with in the following chapter.
Investment-wages in the West-German construction industry
THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT PERTAINING TO INVESTMENT-WAGES
The Proposai of the Construction Union (Leber-Plari)
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PROGRAMME for the Promotion of Construction Workers' Savings
The proposed arrangement is designed to promote the accumulation of assets for construction workers in order to provide an additional degree of security through the médium of personal property.
To accomplish this aim the functions of the building trade's supplementary pension office -an existing agency utilised by ail construction enterprises -should be expanded.
Proposai for Use in a Collective Agreement
A. Funding A collective agreement should stipulate that the employers shall provide 1.5 per cent of the aggregate of wages paid, for the purpose of building up assets for their employées. Thèse contributions shall be collected by the supplementary pension office and passed on to an agency yet to be established, hereinafter named « The Fund ». Thèse resources, * 9 Authorized translation by the Construction Union, in : G. LEBER, Accumulation of Assets for the Worker, op. cit., however, are distinct from other contributions in that they neecl not be paid out in cash, but may be retained within the entreprise for investment purposes.
The employer has the choice between several possibilities of raising thèse monies :
1. The enterprise may dispose of the aggregate sum of its contributions as capital from outside sources ; in other words, a creditor-debtor relationship will be established between the Fund and the enterprise. The loan granted to the enterprise shall bear interest.
2. The employer may convert this outside capital into the enterprise's own capital, resulting in a transfer of company shares to the Fund. The profit-sharing would then hâve to be handled within the framework of the normal distribution of profits.
3. The employer may pay over the contribution in cash to the supplementary pension office for the benefit of the Fund. This alternative is intended to provide firms -especially those in a personal namewith the choice of disassociating the Fund from the enterprise, both as shareholder and as creditor.
B. Function of the Fund
The Fund shall hâve the function of administering claims and capital assets in a way similar to that used by investment firms. The Fund shall invest cash contributions so that they will yield profits and encourage building activity. In particular the Fund shall avail itself of the following courses of action :
1. The resources may be turned over to construction firms for the purpose of additional capital investment, either as loans or authorised capital.
2. Loans earmarked for spécifie purposes may be allocated for building projects of public interest ; this course of action would hâve to be linked with promoting a well-balanced building cycle and, incidentally, a 12 months' full-time employment in the building trade.
3. The resources may be made available as loans on easy terms to construction workers who intend to acquire their own houses ; this measure would provide an additional incentive to those workers for building owner-occupied homes.
C. Benefits Accruing to the Worker
After the contributions paid over to his name hâve reached a certain amount the worker shall receive a share certificate in the value of the accrued sum. This share certificate shall represent his claim vis-à-vis the Fund.
When the worker has reached retirement âge of when, being disabled, he has been granted a social insurance pension he may return his share certificate to the Fund in exchange for the accrued capital at compound interest. As an alternative he shall hâve the choice of retaining the interestbearing shares and even of transferring them by will.
In exceptional cases the worker may be paid the accrued benefits at an earlier date. Pertinent détails shall be stipulated in the standing orders of the Fund.
Frankfort/Main, 9th September, 1964
The Collective Agreement and Us Side Effects
Nine months after the first publication of this proposition of the IG Bau-Steine-Erden the first German collectively bargained programme for capital accumulation in the hands of employées was settled. The negotiations very quickly led to the agreement ; both parties agreed to ask the Fédéral Ministry of Labour to extend the provision of the collective agreement to ail relevant employées in the construction industry. The extension was given on October 11, 1965, as expected. The agreement covers about 1.6 million employées, or about 7.5% of ail employées of the West-German economy in 1966 ^ ; it came into force on January end of each year. The program comprises, in short, the following constituent parts :
1.) Employers will grant any individual employée in the construction industry a benefit of 0.09 DM per working hour if the worker adds a contribution of 0.02 DM per working hour on his own initiative.
2.) The individual employée has to choose the type of long term investment he wants. The contribution will be credited to a savings aoeount or any other type of investment. The contribution is frozen for a five-year period.
The following points in the agreement differ from the original proposition put forward by the construction union :
1.) The contributions to the program of employée capital formation are split into two parts. The employées are not automatically participants in the program ; they hâve to take the initiative and contribute a small part of their présent income.
2.) The employées are not forced to transfer their money to a spécial « Fund ». They can sélect from alternative forms of investments and choose other organizations to save and to invest their income. 63 Table III shows that investment-wage policy did not keep the union from pursuing an active policy in the sector of normal wage increases. A further side effect resulted from the fact that the agreement was made « under the condition that the Second Property Accumulation Law (2. Vermôgensbildungsgesetz) would corne into force on or before Sept. 30, 1965 » 70 , and that it would permit collective agreements on property accumulation. This clause gives législation the final responsibilty for the application of the collective agreement, and représenta an attempt to accelerate the législative procédure by stating a time limit.
In a debate and subséquent vote the majority of the governing coalition (at that time CDU/CSU and FDP) sided with the opposition (SPD) against the FDP (minority of the governing coalition) 71 . As a resuit, the law demanded by the collective agreement was passed within the proposed time limit 72 .
B) The Results of the Collective Agreement
1) The Conséquences of Higher Costs for the Employers
The effects of the collective agreement coincided with a gênerai dépressive tendency in the West-German economy. In the economy as a 66 « Bank for Savings and Promotion of Property >. 67 Grundstein, 16. JAHRGANG, FRANKFURT/M, Oct. 31, 1965, p. 4. 68 The control organ (« Aufsichtsrat ») consiste of 15 members. 8 of thèse are elected représentatives of the savers ; five are elected members of the employées of the bank, one is a représentative of the construction union (président of the union), and one is a représentative of the top management (« Vorstand») of the BFG.
69 Grundstein, op. cit., Oct. 31, p. 4. 70 LEBER, G., Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., p. 49. 71 The debate and the outcome of the voting are reproduced in LEBER, G., Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., The law was passed on May 5, 1965 and was put into force retroactively as of April 1, 1965. whole, this tendency reached its lowest period in the year 1967 (cf . Table  IV) ; in the construction industry the turnover was still decreasing in 1968 (cf. Table V) . Besides the turnover, the number of firms (cf . Table  V) , the investments (cf. Table V) and the income of employers 73 were reduced during the same period. During the dépressive trend higher labour costs affected employers' incomes adversely : priées could not be raised, instead, they had to be lowered for the most part, because of keener compétition. When the boom set in -in the middle of the year 1968 at the latest -priées in the 73 Figures about the employers' income im the construction industry are not available seperately. It may be assurned that their income followed the same trend as the gênerai development shown in Table IV. 74 Statistisches Jahrbuch, op. cit., p. 497. construction industry rose 77 , so that higher costs resulting from both normal wage increases and from investment-wages could be compensated. Because investment-wages were applied in one sector only of the entire national economy, their effects were not différent from those of normal wage increases : they did not dampen demand to a significant extent, so that the higher costs could be taken into account in the calculation of priées.
TABLE IV
Distribution of the National Product in Positive or
The initiative of the construction workers' union was too modest in the context of the entire economy ; the spark of their sectoral initiative did not jump over to the other unions, so that no macroeconomic test of the investment-wages idea was possible. The dampening effects on demand resulting from the sectoral application of the idea could only be hypothesized ; they did not become visible enough to be proven.
The Significance of the Bank System
According to the collective agreement the savings of the employées will be invested by a bank-system in co-operation with the employée, who has the ultimate choice of the type of long term investments he wishes. With this solution the question is raised whether it is to be expected that this System will direct the savings towards the most profitable enterprises.
Access to the capital market is essentially more difficult for small and medium-size companies than for large organizations. The latter hâve, for example, the opportunity to place new stocks or bonds in the capital market, which the employée can purchase directly. Ail other financial actions will be directed by the bank system (including the new BSV), relying on the savings accounts of the employées. But the présent bank System has not succeeded in developing sufficient crédit for small and medium-size companies. In this way the investment-wages can contribute to directing the financial resources toward the big capital corporations. This tendency may be undesirable -especially from the viewpoint of the social market economy (the number of self-employed persons may further decrease) -as long as only the shortage of reasonable crédits puts the smallest firms at a disadvantage.
The edge is taken off this danger, which redistributes the saved capital to the advantage of big capital corporations, by the Second Property Accumulation Law. Tax réductions are granted to ail employers 77 price index for industrial buildings: 1965: 112.8%; 1966: 115.9%; 1967: 110.3%; 1968: 116.1% Statistisches Jahrbuch, op. cit., p. 348. with fewer than 50 employées 78 . They may deduct from their income tax 30% of the amount they contribute to their employées' capital accumulation savings ; the amount they deduct, however, may not exceed 800 DM yearly 78 This régulation is significant for the construction industry, since it has a large number of firms with few employées. The distribution of firms in the construction industry, by no. of employées, shows the following structures: (1966 The BSV paid 6% interest on savings accounts up to Jan. 31, 1967. Thereafter it joined the gênerai trend toward lower interest rates : from February 1 to June 30, 1967, it paid 5Vi%, and since July 1, 1967, it has paid 5% 86 . During the first three years of business ail accounts not subject to withdrawal for 2Vi years received an additional interest bonus ot 3 A%.
In 1966 the BSV interest rates were higher than those of most other banks. As far as crédits were concerned, the bank did not contrive any new forms -such as might hâve favoured, for example, small and middle-sized businesses. In May, 1968, the BSV, in co-operation with the « Allegemeine Hypthekenbank AG » (which, like the BSV, is also a daughter of the Bank fiir Gemeinwirtschaft AG) began to give cheap mortgages. By the end of the year 1967/68 mortgages totalling 18.9 million DM had been granted 87 .
Thèse figures show that the BSV has not grown to a size that would provoke the opponents of the unions to speak of a « silent socia- 
The Reaction of the Employées
Since investment-wages can be deposited at any bank, it is difficult to détermine the exact number of people making use of this plan. Up to January, 1966, about 40% of the 1.6 million employées in the construction industry had applied to participate 88 » 89 . Organized employées (about 30% of the employées in the construction industry are members of the industrial union) make significantly greater 90 use of the investment-wages programme than their non-organized colleagues.
The whole capital accumulation System will be inefficient and even dangerous (inflation push), if the majority or even many of the participating employées withdraw the blocked amount and consume it. Three variables seem important for the saving-education process : 1) the âge of the saver 2) the amount of the accumulated savings, and 3) habituation to dealing with capital in the System of banks and the capital market. The maturity deriving from a higher âge does not develop saliently within 5 years, and to make the employée familiar with the capital market is perhaps a task which exceeds the short-term means of the banks, including the new BSV. For 20 years the banks hâve been trying without much success to gain a large number of workers as customers. Only the amount of the saved income seems likely to stimulate stronger ties between employées and banks. However, the concrète amount of 1,300 DM is relatively small 91 and therefore perhaps still too little. The impression that an amount of this order of magnitude will not promote a new saving habit is enforced if we compare this amount with the priées of the objects of the workers' current purchasing incentives : for instance, télévision sets (black and white) : about 750 DM ; automobiles (small « Volkswagen ») : about 5,000 DM ; automatic washing machines : about 1,200 DM. The 1,300 DM seem too closely related to the price of the preferred goods of the current socially imposed living standard.
88 LEBER, G., Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., p. 244 . 89 « Since then about 45 collective agreements hâve been made ; however, they hâve increased the number of employées affected by only 0.1 million». From:
« Das zweite Vermôgensbildungsgesetz, K. FITTING, V. HENTRICH, op. cit., p. 14. 90 In Grundstein, Oct. 31, 1965, op. cit ., a participation of 80% oir organized employées was predicted. This figure was confirmed in a personal discussion with union officiais in November, 1969. 91 A bricklayer, for example, may hâve an income close to 1,500 DM monthly, including overtime and moonlighting for private housebuilders.
Contrary to thèse hypothetical statements, which predict a « consumption push » 92 , a survey 93 of a représentative sample made by the « Institut fur Angewandte Sozialwissenschaften » in June, 1965, showed that more than half of those interviewed (52% ) do not intend to withdraw their savings accounts at the end of five years ; about of fifth (18% ) is undecided, and almost one third (30%) declared that they intend to spend the money for consumption. Of the 52% intending to continue saving, 27% wanted to save toward a house, 2 /s for their old âge or for rainy days, and Vs for their children.
Whatever may be the actual plans of the individuals involved, the following circumstances hâve delayed the potential consumption and inflation push and hâve spread it over a longer period of time : On December 23, 1966, a law was passed cutting down on saving incentives. The compulsory duration of gênerai savings contracts was extended from 5 to 6 years, and that of instalment savings plans from 6 to 7 years.
In an instalment savings contract, the saver agrées to deposit, at least every three months for 6 years, a certain constant amount. Seven years after the first deposit, the total saved amount plus interest and government bonuses is made available to the saver for his free disposai. In a gênerai savings contract, deposits can be made irregularly during the year, and there is no fixed amount to be deposited. Six years after the end of any year, only the amount aggregated in that year can be withdrawn without loss of the tax and bonus advantage.
As a rule, investment-wages are deposited in instalment savings accounts. If an instalment is not paid -which may easily happen in the construction industry because of high turnover and layoffs during the winter months -, the contract is changed to a gênerai savings contract. Since the latter releases only the annual deposits ( + interest, + bonuses) after six years, significantly smaller sums of money are placed in the hands of the employées than in the case of the originally advertised instalment savings contract.
It remains to be seen how the employées will react when they realize, perhaps not before the end of the 5-year duration of the collective agreement, that their instalment savings contract has had to be changed to a 92 We may assume that a certain part of the accumulated savings will be left in the bank out of habit. Cf. Katona's distinction between « genuine décisions » and « habituai hebavior » in G. KATONA, Psychological Analysis of Economie Behaviour, First McGraw Hill Paperback Edition, (New York, 1963) p. 49. 93 Reproduced in : G. LEBER, Dokumentation, Band 4, op. cit., gênerai savings contract. The BSV and the unions are aware of this danger of disappointment, and consequently they plan to intensif y their information service.
The union expects that the investment-wages programme will become more and more popular as employées watch their accounts growing, without the necessity of any large personal sacrifices, and can tell their colleagues about it. The growth of his savings account is the aspect always visible to the worker -whenever he gets his bank statement in the maileven if the dampening effect on demand and on priées does not suffice to protect thèse savings from a potentially inflationary tendency.
LE SALAIRE D'INVESTISSEMENT : PRINCIPES ET MISE EN PRATIQUE
Dans son sens le plus large, le salaire d'investissement est cette partie du salaire des travailleurs qui ne peut être dépensée pour la consommation pendant un certain temps, parce qu'il est placé pour eux dans l'économie sous forme de capital. Les discussions sur ce sujet en Allemagne ont démontré que cette théorie peut être appliquée selon plusieurs processus et de diverses façons. L'objectif est d'accroître la richesse des travailleurs de façon à leur apporter une plus grande sécurité. En plus de cet objectif à caractère individuel, le salaire d'investissement vise une fin sociale : permettre à tous les agents de l'économie de bénéficier du produit national et diminuer ainsi les écarts économiques. L'épargne individuelle, à elle seule, n'a pas réussi à donner aux travailleurs une part plus grande de l'ensemble de la propriété nationale. C'est à cette lacune que veut pallier la théorie du salaire d'investissement.
Une partie de l'augmentation de salaire ne devrait pas être versée aux travailleurs car elle contribuerait à les pousser à dépenser mais elle serait retenue et convertie en épargnes pour de l'investissement. L'épargne individuelle temporaire et obligatoire semble la seule façon de développer chez les travailleurs une « éducation capitaliste ». Toutefois, il vaut la peine de payer ce prix qu'à la condition que les avantages du salaire d'investissement l'emportent sur ces inconvénients à l'intérieur du processus économique. Cette théorie du salaire d'investissement concorde bien avec les principes et les facteurs fonctionnels de l'économie sociale de marché qui prévaut en République fédérale d'Allemagne.
LES FONDEMENTS DU SALAIRE D'INVESTISSEMENT
Deux ans après la mise en vigueur de l'économie sociale de marché., en 1948, le Conseil scientifique indépendant des affaires économiques du gouvernement fédéral en vint à la conclusion que la distribution de la propriété était très inégale dans le pays. Le système de fonctionnement de la libre entreprise, compris comme orientation de la production selon les besoins du marché, n'est pas automatiquement stable ; dès lors une politique de stabilisation de la part du gouvernement est nécessaire.
Les résultats du processus du marché ne sont pas automatiquement acceptés, spécialement si l'on considère la répartition du revenu national. Dès lors il faut une redistribution du revenu, mais celle-ci doit se faire sans qu'il y ait nécessai-rement des atteintes aux forces compétitrices à l'intérieur du marché. L'interaction de forces du marché n'assure pas le plein emploi ; aussi le gouvernement doit-il avoir une politique active de supervision des affaires. Il essaie d'atteindre simultanément ces trois buts : plein emploi, stabilité des prix et équilibre de la balance des paiements. Il s'agit de trouver un équilibre entre trois choses.
Le gouvernement devrait se servir de son influence pour effectuer une meilleure redistribution du revenu. Ainsi, pour ne pas perturber une saine distribution du revenu, si on s'en tient aux lois du marché libre, le gouvernement devrait en premier lieu utiliser des mesures moins sévères que des augmentations de taxes et qu'une politique du commerce extérieur; il devrait garder pour les cas très sérieux les moyens puissants indirects comme les octrois et ce, aussi longtemps que les difficultés subsistent. Il faudrait réserver uniquement pour les cas d'extrême urgence les interventions directes du gouvernement. Il faudrait la coopération des syndicats et de la direction des entreprises pour réaliser les objectifs gouvernementaux. Cette coopération seule peut permettre à l'économie sociale de marché de fonctionner. Un accroc fort indésirable se produit si le gouvernement détermine le salaire ou si les partenaires sociaux s'entendent sur des salaires et conditions de travail qui mettent en péril la politique du gouvernement. Selon cette conception de l'économie sociale du marché, le rôle et les fonctions des syndicats sont étendus. De simples groupements de pression, ils deviennent les participants dans un effort coopératif à la grandeur du pays. Toutefois il existe des dangers latents à cette nouvelle conception des syndicats.
Les trois questions qui se posent sont les suivantes : est-ce que le principe du salaire d'investissement est compatible avec la théorie de l'économie sociale du marché ? Est-ce que le salaire d'investissement peut être intégré aux négociations collectives ? Quelle est sa force coercitive ? a) Jamais auparavant les conventions collectives n'avaient déterminé l'utilisation obligatoire d'une partie de la rémunération des travailleurs. Le Parlement adopta la « Seconde loi d'accumulation du capital » qui autorisait les représentants des employeurs et des employés à inclure dans les conventions collectives un certain montant que l'employeur pouvait payer en étant exempté des taxes sur les profits et les salaires de même que des contributions pour la sécurité sociale, à condition que ce revenu des travailleurs serve à l'investissement.
Plusieurs juristes ont émis l'opinion que ce système était légal et en sont venus à la conclusion que le salaire d'investissement était partie intégrante de la rémunération et que le gouvernement ne devrait pas s'en mêler. b) Après quelques hésitations, les employeurs se rangèrent à cette décision. Leurs préoccupations s'orientèrent sur les aspects de coercition collective de la proposition. En général, on soutint que l'épargne devait être volontaire, encouragé par des stimulants, etc. Toutefois, l'expérience de la « Première loi sur l'accumulation du capital» avait démontré que les mesures à caractère individuel n'étaient pas suffisantes pour en arriver à la redistribution désirée de la propriété. De plus, la publicité poussant à la consommation l'emportait beaucoup sur les encouragements à épargner. Dans quelle mesure, la théorie du salaire d'investissement peut-elle être appliquée dans une économie en croissance si l'on ne perd pas de vue les objectifs de plein emploi et de stabilité des prix ? Il faut conserver un équilibre entre la consommation, l'investissement et l'épargne, afin de pousser le plein emploi et le développement et encore prévenir les tendances inflationnistes et la récession de l'économie.
Le syndicat de la construction avait préparé un plan de salaire d'investissement (Plan Leber) qui aurait utilisé l'Office des rentes supplémentaires de l'industrie de la construction après avoir accru ses fonctions.
Selon ce plan, la convention collective aurait statué que les employeurs verseraient 1.5% de la masse salariale payée en vue de constituer un capital pour leurs employés. Les contributions seraient perçues par l'Office des rentes supplé-mentaires. Elles seraient distinctes des autres et seraient mises dans un fonds spécial. Il ne serait pas nécessaire qu'elles soient payées en argent mais elles pourraient être retenues dans l'entreprise sous forme d'investissement. Ce fonds fonctionnera suivant les procédés administratifs ordinaires qu'utilisent les sociétés de financement. Il devra investir les contributions en argent comptant de façon à ce qu'elles rapportent des bénéfices et qu'elles suscitent l'activité dans la construction. Ses ressources devront être affectées à des entreprises de la construction afin que celles-ci possèdent plus de capital d'investissement, soit sous forme de prêts ou d'actions. L'argent pourra aussi être utilisé pour des prêts destinés à des projets spéciaux d'intérêt public ; il pourra encore être prêté à des travailleurs de la construction afin de leur permettre d'acheter ou de construire leur propre maison.
Quand les contributions auront été versées, le travailleur recevra une part qui représentera ses droits dans le fonds. Lorsque le travailleur prendra sa retraite ou deviendra impotent, il peut retourner au fonds sa part en échange de son capital accru avec l'intérêt composé. Dans les cas exceptionnels, le travailleur peut recevoir ce qui lui est dû à une date antérieure. C'est en 1965 que fut négociée pour la première fois une convention collective comprenant un plan d'accumulation de capital pour les travailleurs. Les deux parties se sont entendues pour étendre cet accord à tous les travailleurs dans l'industrie de la construction. La convention s'applique à près de 1.6 million de travailleurs, soit environ 7.5% de tous les travailleurs ouest-allemands en 1966.
Voici quelques-unes des parties de l'accord : les employeurs accordent à chacun des travailleurs dans l'industrie de la construction une prime de 0.09 DM par heure de travail effectuée si le travailleur en fournit ; le travailleur peut choisir la sorte d'investissement à long terme qu'il désire, lequel sera immobilisé pour une durée de 5 ans.
Un individu aura ainsi une accumulation de capital d'environ 1,300 DM après 5 ans, ceci incluant l'intérêt et la prime que le gouvernement fédéral garantit à tout épargnant ayant un compte d'épargne bloqué pour 5 ans.
Toutefois, les demandes syndicales dépassaient ce salaire d'investissement : au cours de la même négociation ils ont obtenu un accroissement normal de salaire de 6% plus 2.4% de compensation pour la diminution de la semaine de travail durant l'hiver. Les effets de cette convention collective coïncidèrent avec un mouvement général de dépression de l'économie ouest-allemande, qui atteignit son point le plus bas en 1967. On a connu alors une baisse dans les investissements, le nombre des entreprises et le revenu des employeurs. Pendant cette dépression, les coûts de travail influencèrent de façon nocive le revenu des employeurs. Lors de la reprise, au milieu de 1968, les prix dans l'industrie de la construction se sont élevés. Parce que le salaire d'investissement avait été appliqué à un seul secteur, ses effets ne furent pas différents de ceux d'une augmentation normale de salaire ; ils n'influencèrent pas la demande d'une façon importante.
Les épargnes des travailleurs doivent être investis dans une banque où les travailleurs eux-mêmes ont le choix ultime du type de placement à long terme qu'ils désirent. Mais est-ce que ce régime ne dirigera pas les épargnes vers les entreprises les plus profitables ? La voie d'accès aux marchés des capitaux est beaucoup plus difficile pour les petites et moyennes entreprises que pour les grandes. Ce genre de banque n'a pas réussi à accroître suffisamment le crédit pour les petites et moyennes entreprises. De cette façon le salaire d'investissement contribue à diriger les ressources financières vers les grandes entreprises et avec la rareté des crédits, les entreprises les plus petites sont désavantagées. Ce danger est mitigé par la « Seconde loi d'accumulation du capital ». Des réductions d'impôt sont accordées à tous les employeurs ayant moins de 50 employés. Cette disposition est significative dans l'industrie de la construction puisqu'un très grand nombre d'entreprises ont peu d'employés.
mnr .
Jusqu'à janvier 1966, environ 40% des 30.6 millions de travailleurs de l'industrie de la construction avaient demandé de participer à ce programme. Les travailleurs membres du syndicat participent beaucoup plus au programme que leurs confrères non syndiqués. Le programme serait inopérant ou même dangereux si la plupart ou seulement plusieurs des employés retiraient leurs économies. Un sondage effectué en 1965 a montré que 52% des travailleurs interrogés n'avaient aucunement l'intention de retirer leur compte d'épargne au bout de 5 ans ; 18% ne savaient pas et 30% dirent qu'ils allaient dépenser cet argent. Quels que soient les plans actuels des travailleurs concernés, les circonstances suivantes ont différé la consommation éventuelle et la poussée de l'inflation et l'ont répartie sur une plus longue période de temps. En décembre 1966, une loi a été passée pour restreindre les stimulants à l'épargne. La durée obligatoire des contrats d'épargne à long terme a été portée de 5 à 6 ans et celle d'un contrat d'épargne par versement, de 6 à 7 ans.
Dans un contrat d'épargnes par versements, l'épargnant accepte de déposer au moins à tous les trois mois pendant 6 ans un certain montant d'argent. Sept ans après le premier dépôt, le montant total des épargnes, plus la prime du gouvernement, lui est remis pour qu'il en dispose comme il l'entend. Dans un contrat général d'épargne, les dépôts peuvent être faits plus régulièrement durant l'année et il n'y a pas de montant fixe qui doit être déposé. Six ans après la fin de chaque année, seulement le montant accumulé durant cette année peut être retiré sans perdre les avantages des diminutions d'impôt et de la prime.
Il reste à voir ce que les travailleurs diront lorsqu'ils sauront que ces contrats d'épargnes par versements devront être changés en contrat général d'épargne à long terme. La BSV et les syndicats sont conscients de ce danger et de cette déception possible. Les syndicats espèrent que ce programme de salaire d'investissement deviendra de plus en plus populaire lorsque les travailleurs verront leurs économies augmenter, même si les effets restrictifs sur la demande et les prix ne réussissent pas à protéger suffisamment ces épargnes d'une tendance inflationniste possible. 
POUVOIR ET « POUVOIRS » EN RELATIONS DU TRAVAIL
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